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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Union Treaty signed 
President Boris Yel'tsin and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka met in 
Moscow on 8 December, the eighth anniversary of the creation of the CIS, to 
sign, finally, the new Russian-Belarusian Union Treaty. In a speech to mark the 
ceremony, Yel'tsin praised the treaty as a means "to create a unified economic, 
customs, defence and humanitarian space." (ITAR-TASS, 1342 GMT, 8 Dec 99; 
via World News Connection) 
 
While each country's parliament still needs to ratify the treaty for it to take effect, 
questions of its potential usefulness have already been raised by the inability of 
its Higher Council, or even the two presidents themselves, to reach a decision on 
who will chair the State Council, created under the agreement. 
 
Yel'tsin plays nuclear card 
President Yel'tsin, who was only recently discharged from the hospital after 
suffering a bout of pneumonia, has been remarkably active in the past two 
weeks. In addition to the meeting with Lukashenka, Yel'tsin made his way to 
China for a series of meetings with Jiang Zemin. While in China, Yel'tsin 
responded to Western, and more specifically American, criticism of Russia's 
tactics in the war on Chechnya by brandishing Russia's nuclear arsenal. 
"[Clinton] evidently forgot ... that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons." 
(INTERFAX, 9 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Reaction to Yel'tsin's comments seems to follow two very different paths. The 
first, and more prevalent in the West, is that Yel'tsin's remarks were a result of 
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his diminished capacity and ill health. This position was most blatantly laid out by 
the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, who claimed that 
Yel'tsin "is not someone in full possession of all his faculties." (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 1600 PST, 14 Dec 99; via C-afp@Clari.net) 
 
This interpretation is bolstered by reports that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and 
other Russian officials are attempting to do "damage control" in follow-up 
comments on Yel'tsin's remarks. Hence Putin's characterization of the Russian-
US relationship as "very good" is seen as a move to distance himself from the 
president. What these reports fail to point out, however, is the strong support 
Yel'tsin received from the Russian media, where his use of the "nuclear card" 
was both applauded (as in Nezavisimaya gazeta's coverage, which stated that 
"The president was right") and accepted as a choreographed move meant to 
warn the West that further criticism would cement a Moscow-Beijing alliance. 
(REUTERS, 10 Dec 99; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
The Russian reaction suggests a different interpretation of Yel'tsin's comments. 
The prime minister's recent criticism of Western interference in Russian affairs, 
which also reiterated the president's nuclear reminder, does imply that the initial 
comments were not simply another example of Yel'tsin's blustering buffoonery or 
incapacitation. At a time when international concern over Russia's actions in 
Chechnya seems to be headed towards some actual consequences for Russia in 
international organizations and financing, the president and prime minister have 
chosen to remind Western leaders of the rationale for engagement that 
underpins their policy on Russia: It's a nuclear power that is just too large to be 
allowed to fail. 
 
APPARAT 
The quest for immunity 
Several members of the Kremlin inner circle have apparently decided that 
whatever happens in next year's presidential elections, it might be prudent to 
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have a backup plan to provide legal protection for them. Political immunity, it 
appears, just fits the bill. Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich are standing 
for seats in the new Duma, and Pavel Borodin is running for Moscow mayor. 
Berezovsky, who is seeking a seat from Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and 
Abramovich, who is running from Chukotka, have apparently chosen rather 
remote areas in order to dim the glare of the Moscow press. Television journalist 
Aleksandr Nevzorov, who is campaigning for Abramovich, has a great pitch to 
the electorate: "He gets something out of you, and you get something out of him." 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0740 PST, 15 Dec 99; via C-afp@Clari.net) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Hurdles to negotiations 
On 10 December, PM Putin listed four preconditions for negotiations with 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Putin, who no longer recognizes 
Maskhadov as Chechnya's legitimate president, is demanding: 1) a denunciation 
of all terrorism; 2) the release of all hostages; 3) the extradition of the organizers 
of the bombings in Moscow and other regions; 4) the extradition of the leaders of 
the assault on Dagestan. (ITAR-TASS, 1707 GMT, 10 Dec 99; via World News 
Connection) These terms would seem to represent a settlement proposal, rather 
than a precondition for talks, but in any event, the extradition of Basaev, with 
whom Maskhadov formed an alliance in the wake of the Russian advance into 
Chechnya, is likely too high a hurdle for Maskhadov to overcome. These 
unrealistic terms provide further proof that Russia is not interested in pursuing a 
political solution to the Chechen situation. 
 
Constitutional changes possible? 
With the approach of the Duma elections, the concerns that the new Duma would 
interfere with the government appear to be growing, and it seems the preferred 
approach to resolving any conflicts will be a revision of the constitutionally 
enshrined relationship between the parliament and government. While no detail 
of the substance or manner in which the constitution will be altered has been 
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published, it appears clear after President Yel'tsin's Constitution Day remarks 
regarding a "dialogue on perfecting the constitution," that change is in the offing. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1015 GMT, 12 Dec 99; via World News Connection) Earlier 
remarks by Putin identify part of the problem: "the mechanism between the Duma 
and the government must be carefully worked out." Putin is also advocating 
systemic changes in the apparat throughout the Kremlin, government and 
regions. (ITAR-TASS, 1340 GMT, 3 Dec 99; via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
The thin multipolar line 
Russia's multipolar policy envisions good relations with non-Western countries, 
but lately Russia's domestic policy has put relations with Islamic countries in a 
tight spot. Concerned about the fate of its Muslim "brethren" in the Caucasus 
since the fighting began last August, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) sought to visit Moscow and the Caucasus. Proving that Russia's multipolar 
policy can be tricky at times, this was the first delegation welcomed by Moscow 
to monitor its "strictly internal" campaign. Not surprisingly, the OIC delegation, led 
by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Khazzari, gave a balanced response in 
Moscow following talks with Prime Minister Putin and Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov. The delegation voiced support for Russia's sovereignty in the region, 
calling the Russian "measures" in Chechnya "adequate," but found the military 
operation "not proportional." (INTERFAX, 1332 GMT, 6 Dec 99; via World News 
Connection) The issue is a tricky one for both sides. Many Muslim countries are 
traditional allies of Russia and gain from maintaining friendly bilateral ties. 
Likewise, Russia benefits from its Muslim "non-Western" partners to sustain the 
multipolar policy, especially while under fierce Western criticism for the operation 
in Chechnya. For now, the OIC seems content to supply humanitarian assistance 
to the refugees and urge Russia to find a peaceful political solution quickly, 
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beginning with a cease-fire. In order to keep OIC criticism at bay, Russia will 
have to accept humanitarian advances by the OIC countries and possibly some 
level of OIC involvement in the dispute.  
 
Rip van Yel'tsin wakes up in Beijing 
Awakening from a "therapeutic sleep" administered by his physicians during the 
long plane ride to Beijing (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Dec 99), President Yel'tsin 
finally met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin on 9-10 December. The visit 
comes at a time when Moscow needs all the good diplomacy it can make. 
Despite its traditional rivalry and mistrust of China, in the face of criticism from 
the West over Chechnya Russia has used its "strategic cooperative partnership" 
with China to diplomatic advantage. In effect, the trip was a chance for the ailing 
Yel'tsin to play statesman and, despite some fumbles, he made it through in one 
piece.  
 
Yel'tsin and Jiang signed several documents during the visit and voiced their 
common stance on a variety of issues, including Russia's sovereignty over 
Chechnya, the importance of upholding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
the inadvisability of US National Missile Defense plans, and the importance of 
continuing to build Russian-Chinese economic ties, especially through arms 
sales. (ITAR-TASS, 1422 GMT, 7 Dec 99; via World News Connection) All of the 
agreements have been long in the making and the trip was more of a diplomatic 
show than a substantive meeting. Diplomatically, the visit was clearly intended to 
draw attention to Russia's close relationship with China and to Russia's 
imperviousness to Western criticism. By far, the most important message to 
come out of the meeting concerned the state of human rights; both presidents 
have faced criticism from the West on this topic, and in response they issued a 
joint statement saying that human rights are second to national sovereignty. 
However, this important message was somewhat overshadowed by Yel'tsin's 
explosive message to US President Bill Clinton in which he defiantly reminded 
Clinton of Russia's nuclear capability. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Liberal Democrats' registration again repealed upon appeal 
The story continues. Just after restoring the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's 
(LDPR) registration, thereby allowing it to run for seats in the next Duma, the 
presidium of the Supreme Court ruled that the court was in error and again 
revoked the LDPR's registration. (INTERFAX, 1542 GMT, 8 Dec 99; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The presidium ruled that, when the CEC removed Vladimir Zhirinovsky's name 
from the restored LDPR list, it simultaneously rendered the entire LDPR list 
invalid. Current law states that if one of the top three members on the party list is 
disqualified, the entire list is invalidated.  
 
Because of this latest reversal of the previous reversal, the original electoral 
ballots already printed no longer need to be amended, although the ultra-rightist 
Spas (Salvation) party, which also had its registration revoked by a court in 
Moscow, remains on the ballot. CEC Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov said 
something will be done to remedy this. 
 
In addition to the LDPR, the restored registration of the Russian Conservative 
Party of Businessmen was similarly revoked. This left 27 blocs and parties 
running for office on 19 December. (ITAR-TASS, 0713 GMT, 9 Dec 99; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
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Rising fortunes for Unity, declining ones for Fatherland-All Russia 
According to a Moscow Times poll conducted during the first 10 days of 
December, the Communists and the Unity bloc would both receive 19 percent of 
the vote. Fatherland-All Russia, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former prime 
minister Yevgeny Primakov's bloc, would receive only 9.2 percent of the vote. 
The poll, in which 1,278 people across the country were interviewed, was 
conducted for the newspaper by the Institute for Comparative Social Research, 
or CESSI.  
 
These results are rather surprising considering the fact that the Unity bloc is 
generally considered to be a Kremlin creation organized to support Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin's presidential candidacy should he decide to run. 
Primakov and Luzhkov's bloc, on the other hand, was considered by most 
observers to be far stronger. Unity's amazing fortunes can be partly attributed to 
Putin's broad popularity, given his association with the bloc. But the Kremlin has 
also been hammering away at Fatherland-All Russia for weeks now in the media, 
especially on ORT, so a slip in support might be expected.  
 
The poll also suggests 6.5 percent support for Grigory Yavlinsky's YABLOKO, 
6.4 percent for former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko's Union of Right Forces, 
and 5.9 percent to the Zhirinovsky Bloc. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Dec 99; 
www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma plans to grant amnesty for combatants in Chechnya 
As if the Russian brutality in Chechnya were not enough, the Duma in its wisdom 
has passed a resolution providing amnesty for "those involved in the armed 
conflict in the Chechen Republic." At first blush the resolution looks like it might 
be an attempt to reintegrate Chechnya and its people back into the federation, 
but upon closer reading the bill expressly excludes "those guilty of committing 
acts of terror, murder of civilians, and persons regarded as dangerous 
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recidivists." Whom the act covers, therefore, is left unclear. Presumably it does 
not include the Russians themselves, although it certainly describes their recent 
actions. 
 
But perhaps the most important aspect of the resolution, and also its most chilling 
part, states that no criminal charges will be filed against servicemen "who 
committed crimes in the North Caucasus in the course of the conflict." This looks 
like an open invitation to pillage and plunder, and it will most likely be interpreted 
by Russian soldiers in the field as such. (INTERFAX, 1553 GMT, 3 Dec 99; via 
World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Russian Cold War espionage alive and well 
Diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States endured another 
setback recently over the issue of espionage. On 29 November, the media 
reported the arrest of Navy cryptologist Daniel King for sending information in 
1994 to Russian officials concerning US submarines' eavesdropping efforts on 
Russian undersea cables. Investigators believe King's efforts were a one-time 
affair and the security breaches allegedly made were not as serious as other 
recent naval espionage cases. One day later, Russia's Federal Security Service 
(FSB) abruptly reacted by arresting Cheri Leberknight, a secretary in the US 
Moscow embassy, after catching her "red-handed attempting to receive state 
secrets." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 1 Dec 99) The FSB detained Ms. 
Leberknight, declared her persona non grata, and then asked her leave Russia 
forever. Leberknight left Russia on 10 December. 
 
Finally, on 9 December the FBI detained Russian embassy employee Stanislav 
Gusev for conducting espionage activities outside the State Department building 
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in Washington, DC. Gusev was allegedly receiving information from a listening 
device secretly placed in the building's seventh floor conference room where 
sensitive meetings were held. Security personnel became suspicious while 
observing Gusev's habit of carefully feeding parking meters to avoid receiving 
parking tickets. Washington area diplomats typically plead diplomatic immunity 
when fined for parking violations. An FSB spokesman was quick to call reports of 
the listening device "implausible" and said the arrest was probably in retaliation 
for Leberknight's expulsion. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 10 Dec 99) 
 
Due to the listening device's sophistication and location, US officials believe the 
bug was installed by Russian agents who took advantage of the building's lax 
security. Until last fall, the State Department allowed visitors to have unescorted 
access. FBI officials last summer commenced a building sweep for bugs after 
noting Gusev's suspicious activities. However, the seventh floor, believed to be 
the most secure in the building, was not swept until early fall. After detecting the 
bug at that time, the State Department fed disinformation until Gusev's arrest. 
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright downplayed the incident, other 
department officials called the security breach serious. FBI Assistant Director 
Neil Gallagher even said, "This is not only a story of effective counterintelligence 
... it's also a very important story of the aggressive activity of Russian intelligence 
presence inside the United States." (THE WASHINGTON POST, 10 Dec 99)  
 
Moscow's bold espionage efforts lead to the conclusion that, despite the end of 
the Cold War, Russia's political leaders view the US as their primary adversary. 
Clinton administration officials even complained this year to Moscow that too 
many spies were operating in the Russian embassy. On the other hand, the CIA 
significantly scaled back operations in Moscow in the 1990s and opened stations 
in many of the newly independent states. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Dec 99) 
Russia uses information from its robust espionage efforts to develop strategy to 
counter the pre-eminence of the US and further a more "multipolar" world. The 
Russian intelligence community's rising force in the security and policymaking 
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arena was highlighted with the appointment of the hard-line FSB head Vladimir 
Putin to prime minister, the third successive former KGB agent appointed to the 
position. The ascendant political fortunes of hard-liners, aided by the war in 
Chechnya and tensions with the West, may contribute to a resurgence of 
Russian imperialism and additional strategic headaches for the US. 
 
Politics is alive and well in the military 
For the Western, particularly the American, mind, the overt involvement of federal 
military forces in national elections is a "foreign" (no pun intended) and awkward 
concept. Not so in today's Russia. Last week the Kremlin ordered the defense 
ministry leadership to organize military support for the pro-Putin Unity political 
bloc headed by Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu in the December 
parliamentary elections. According to a Military News Agency source, a 
recommendation for holding the final stage of the election campaign was 
disseminated among Russia's military districts. Major General Anatoly Shatalov, 
chief of the defense ministry's press service and defense minister's press 
secretary, sent the following instructions to the military districts: "In order to better 
inform the Armed Forces' personnel about the upcoming elections, it would be 
expedient to reprint the article "Our Force is Unity" published by the Krasnaya 
Zvezda Daily on 26 Nov, 1999 in all district and fleet newspapers." The phrase 
"Our Force is Unity" is an election slogan used by the Unity political bloc. 
(DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 13 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
That the military has been openly courted and aligned with government-
sponsored political parties is not unprecedented in post-Soviet Russia. That the 
military represents a strong political voice and individual members can, in fact, 
run as candidates in local elections while still in uniform is a right granted under 
the Russian constitution. For instance, under Part IV, Chapter 13, Article 100, 
"meetings of servicemen in their military units" have the right to nominate 
candidates for people's deputy. Moreover, "citizens and public organizations" (the 
inclusion of military units is implied) are guaranteed the right to free and all-round 
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discussion of the political and personal qualities and competence of candidates, 
and the right to campaign for them at meetings, in the press, and on television 
and radio. 
 
The potential political clout wielded by the military is a nightmarish scenario in the 
back of the mind of every disciple of military history and strategy. Blasphemous 
images related to "military coup," "military dictator," and "martial law" chill the 
bones of political and military leaders. A 1994 survey of Russia's military elite by 
the Friederich Ebert Foundation -- one of Europe's leading research centers -- 
highlighted the desire the military had for a "firm hand" in politics combined with a 
conviction of the need to develop democracy. But even more adamant was the 
military elite's absolute insistence that a military dictatorship was not possible in 
Russia, as if by stating it so emphatically it could never possibly be considered. 
(IZVESTIA, 22 Oct 94; via World News Connection)  
 
What will be interesting to watch over the next few years is how the military may 
or may not apply its largely untapped political power, especially in the aftermath 
of Chechnya, to address its serious deficits in defense spending, personnel and 
readiness -- areas which are shaking the core of military effectiveness and 
morale, and creating increasing frustration on the part of senior military leaders. 
An indication that the military is beginning to test this power can be seen in the 
unprecedented move last November when senior field commanders in Chechnya 
warned Russian leaders that they would react unfavorably to any premature halt 
in military operations. The leading spokesman, General Vladimir Shamanov, 
commander of the western grouping of forces in Chechnya, stated on 4 
November that "there will be a powerful exodus of officers of various ranks, 
including generals from the armed forces, because the officer's corps may not 
survive another slap in the face." (THE NIS OBSERVED, 15 Nov 99) And the 
results of this first overt test? The military was placated with overwhelming 
support from the political leadership. The power test -- a success. 
 
 12 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
CIS 
Russia's Chechnya operation takes a toll on the CIS 
The fallout from Russia's Chechen operation is affecting the CIS. As the conflict 
rages in the North Caucasus, "stray" bombs and ill-conceived Russian initiatives 
have hit Russia's fellow CIS members. In early November, concurrent with 
Russian claims that Georgia and Azerbaijan were hosting terrorists and allowing 
Chechnya-bound supplies to transit their territory, Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin suggested new visa requirements for travel to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, much to the consternation of those countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1719 
GMT, 4 Nov 99; via World News Connection) Since then, the Azeri president 
apparently managed to assuage Moscow's stated concerns. The Georgians, on 
the other hand, have yet to discuss the issue with Russia at all.  
 
This threat to institute travel regulations, whether realized or not, strikes at the 
heart of both the commonwealth's founding documents and the treaty regarding 
visa-free movement among CIS states. Regardless of Prime Minister Putin's 
motivation -- which officially remains halting "terrorists" -- the mere suggestion 
that Russia would abrogate these agreements further undermines any 
semblance of stability among CIS member states. CIS Executive Secretary Yuri 
Yarov called Putin's suggestion "not the best solution," pointing out that the 
matter would be better solved in an "interstate" or bilateral forum. (INTERFAX, 
1702 GMT, 7 Dec 99; via World News Connection) However, Russia and 
Georgia have yet to discuss the issue. As of 7 December, Moscow had only 
announced that it might recall Russian diplomats and their families from the 
Georgian capital for "security reasons." (INTERFAX, 1902 GMT, 7 Dec 99; via 
World News Connection) In response, the Georgian foreign ministry said that it 
believes a visa regime could "cause the end of the CIS." (ITAR-TASS, 1700 
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GMT, 10 Dec 99; via World News Connection) Russia has few supporters in the 
CIS regarding the matter. Even Yarov has said that he will be forced to side with 
the Georgians if the issue is placed on the CIS agenda. 
 
Since Putin's comments in November, Russia has called in the legal experts to 
reword the statement, emphasizing that, if such a decision were made, the visa 
regime would only last as long as the "federal anti-terrorist operation in 
Chechnya," according to the head of the International Legal Department of the 
Russian Federation Border Service. Furthermore, Russia would reconsider if 
"some countries" took measures to ensure the security of their CIS borders. 
(INTERFAX, 0906 GMT, 9 Dec 99; via World News Connection) Already over 
three months long, the war for Chechnya seems far from over; the longer it 
rages, the greater the damage will be to CIS relations. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Look both ways before you step off that curb... 
Imagine that you wake up, the sun is shining, your clothes fit perfectly, you get 
complimented on your appearance, the birds are singing, and then a speeding 
car skids onto the sidewalk, hits you and drags you along the street. 
 
This must have been what Leonid Kuchma felt like on 10 December, as he was 
blindsided by both Russian demands over energy arrears and a blockade of his 
government by the Ukrainian parliament. It was on this day that his post-election 
honeymoon, complete with a victory lap in the US to pick up congratulations from 
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, came to an abrupt end. Of 
course, Kuchma had to endure expected criticism from the US over his actions 
during the election campaign. And of course, he had to endure the normal 
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rejection from the European Union, but for a few blissful weeks, he did not have 
to endure a barrage of attacks from the parliament. For a few blissful weeks, he 
had the national and international stage to himself, and used it to his advantage. 
For a few blissful weeks, there was no overt pressure from Russia over gas 
arrears and Slavic unions. But now the honeymoon is over. Very over. 
 
On 10 December, Russia announced that it had "suspended the export of oil and 
electricity to Ukraine," as the result of Ukraine "stealing" 150-200 cubic meters of 
gas a day as it was transported through the country on the way to Ankara. 
(INTERFAX, 1434 GMT, 10 Dec 99; via World News Connection) It quickly 
became clear, however, that this statement made by Russian Fuel and Energy 
Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny may have been an exaggeration, particularly since 
Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh denied that any supplies 
had been cut. "Deliveries of oil and oil products are handled by commercial firms, 
so there's nothing [for the state] to halt," he said. (REUTERS, 14 Dec 99; via 
Russia Today) The confusions was worsened when Ukrainian Prime Minister 
Valeriy Pustovoytenko told ITAR-TASS that Ukraine would attempt to convince 
Russia to "reconnect the Ukrainian and Russian power grids," but also that 
Kalyuzhny's statement was only a threat and that no decisions will be taken on 
the Russian side" prior to talks between the governments. (ITAR-TASS, 2121 
GMT, 10 Dec 99; via World News Connection) 
 
There is no question, though, that Ukraine is enduring a decrease in electricity 
supplies. According to Izvestia, however, the culprit is not Russian sanctions 
because of Ukrainian gas theft, but rather a technical problem with the joint 
Russian/Ukrainian electrical grids. Izvestia reported recently that joint operation 
of the electrical grids stopped on 27 November "because of some technical 
problems. According to Russian electrical engineers, the disconnection might 
have been caused by the instability of the necessary current frequency in the 
Ukrainian electricity supply network." (IZVESTIA, 14 Dec 99; What the Papers 
Say, via lexis-nexis) So, while Russia may be trying its best to use these 
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technical problems to its advantage, it appears that Kalyuzhny's recent 
statements were threats, disguised as action. No gas or oil exports were cut -- 
nor will they be now that Kalyuzhny has announced a "restoration" of oil exports -
- and the electrical grids are experiencing the same technical problems that they 
have experienced in the past. The threats, however, are yet another reminder of 
Ukraine's dependence on Russia for one of its most important resources, and 
must be an immense source of agitation for Kuchma's administration, especially 
since the West continues to delay its promised funding for construction of two 
nuclear reactors.  
 
This agitation was undoubtedly multiplied tenfold just a few days after 
Kalyuzhny's announcement, when the Ukrainian parliament once again chose 
politics and revenge over fiscal responsibility. On 14 December, MPs refused to 
reconfirm Pustovoytenko as prime minister. The decision played a part in making 
the hryvnia continue its downward spiral, and caused the IMF, World Bank, and 
EU to refuse to commit to releasing the latest tranches of their respective loans. 
All of this happened when things had seemed, for one brief, slightly shining 
moment, to be on the upswing. Kuchma's inaugural speech and his statements 
during a three-country foreign tour were well received, and both he and 
Pustovoytenko seemed committed to speeding up reform efforts. Despite energy 
and grain shortages, and despite a less than resounding show of support for 
Kuchma the man during the election, it seemed as if Kuchma the president had 
garnered some momentum from his win at the polls.  
 
Kuchma's administration seemed finally to have a grasp on what was necessary 
to secure the next tranches of Ukraine's loans from various international lenders 
and, with Pustovoytenko, Kuchma set about to do just that. Since his election, 
Kuchma has issued a decree that would remake the agricultural system, largely 
abolishing collective farms by April of 2000. He has decreed tax changes 
requested by the IMF, and announced a government restructuring. On 14 
December, Kuchma signed a decree cutting the number of ministries, 
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departments and committees to 35 from 89. There will now be 15 ministries 
instead of 21. In addition, each minister will be limited to four deputies, instead of 
the 15 that many have had. Kuchma also recently disbanded the National Guard, 
which reported only to the president and members of parliament, saving 
approximately $10 million. (ITAR-TASS, 15 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Until the president and parliament can agree on a new government, however, 
this momentum will be stalled. On 17 December, Kuchma moved to end the 
government crisis by nominating National Bank Chairman Viktor Yushchenko as 
the next prime minister. (REUTERS, 17 Dec 99; via America Online) 
Yushchenko's appointment is supported by Western organizations, and while it is 
likely that he will be approved by the parliament, there is a chance that his critics 
there -- who have criticized him vigorously in the past -- will attempt to block his 
confirmation. It will be an interesting test to see just how much of a price the 
parliament will make Kuchma pay for his election victory. Will parliament 
members agree on a new government, or will they drag out the situation, bringing 
the country down with them? 
 
BELARUS 
Please, if we ask nicely, will you talk to us? 
Representatives of the OSCE have yet again returned to Belarus to "insist" that 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka begin a dialogue with the opposition regarding "free and 
fair" elections next year. (INTERFAX, 1504 GMT, 15 Dec 99; via World News 
Connection) Alas, this is familiar terrain for the OSCE. Unfortunately, the 
organization has had little success in the past with such requests, and will 
undoubtedly have little success this time. Yet, its members keep on trying.  
 
In early October of this year, Belarusian authorities agreed to take the OSCE up 
on its first mediation offer, and to begin talks with opposition representatives. Just 
days after this announcement, the Belarusian Freedom March resulted in almost 
200 arrests and a number of injuries as police clashed with 20,000 protesters. As 
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reported previously in The NIS Observed, neither this fact, nor the disappearance 
and/or arrest of several prominent opposition members deterred the OSCE from 
its mission, and negotiated talks began later that month. The European Union 
welcomed this news, saying that this dialogue would help move the country out 
of its political crisis. (INTERFAX, 1340 GMT, 2 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection)  
 
Shortly thereafter, less than two weeks before Lukashenka was to travel to the 
OSCE summit in Istanbul, the Belarusian government and the OSCE reported a 
major breakthrough. On 9 November, the government and opposition signed an 
agreement giving opposition parties access to the media at specific times and in 
specific publications. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1702 GMT, 9 Nov 99; via 
lexis-nexis) Unfortunately, Lukashenka failed to sign the agreement, making it 
moot. This fact was successfully concealed, however, until after the OSCE 
summit, where criticism of Lukashenka was much more limited than anticipated.  
 
Shortly after the summit, Lukashenka made a goodwill gesture to the OSCE, 
perhaps attempting to mitigate the lack of his signature on the media access 
agreement. He released opposition leader and former Prime Minister Mikhail 
Chigir from prison after six months in custody. The decision was hailed by the 
OSCE, the US, and the EU, among others.  
 
Since then, however, there have been no further goodwill gestures on 
Lukashenka's part. Two major opposition figures, Yury Zakharenko and Viktor 
Gonchar, remain missing. Tamara Vinnikova, former Central Bank chairwoman, 
however, phoned an opposition newspaper in Minsk to say that she has escaped 
out of the country after being missing for over five months. She accused the 
authorities of trying to kill her, and said, "I am determined to do what the 
authorities fear most -- I will engage in politics." (REUTERS, 14 Dec 99; via 
Russia Today)  
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International organizations have remained quiet about Vinnikova's statements. 
The OSCE has, however, criticized the government for recently subjecting 
opposition leader Andrei Klimov "to brutal treatment after refusal to move from 
custody at Minsk preliminary investigation center Number one to the court ...," 
and demanded that Klimov be given the medical attention which he reportedly is 
being denied. (INTERFAX, 1107 GMT, 14 Dec 99; via World News Connection)  
 
Just one day later, on 15 December, the OSCE was back to insisting that 
Lukashenka talk to the opposition, however. "The policy of the Belarusian 
leadership of taking one step forward and two steps back cannot serve 
democratic purposes," said OSCE representative Adrian Severin. (INTERFAX, 
1504 GMT, 15 Dec 99; via World News Connection) Really? Well, that's all right. 
I'm sure if we give them another chance, they'll do the right thing this time. Won't 
they? 
 
MOLDOVA 
One step back from the brink  
President Petru Lucinschi stepped back from an opportunity to dissolve 
parliament this week, when he named Dumitri Bragis as his choice to be the next 
prime minister of Moldova. Bragis, deputy minister for economics and reform in 
Ion Sturza's dismissed cabinet, is the third prime ministerial candidate offered by 
Lucinschi since Sturza's government lost a parliamentary vote of confidence on 9 
November. Since that time, Moldova's government has been paralyzed, and 
faces the probability of defaulting on its foreign debt in the near future. Under 
Moldova's constitution, after the parliament rejects two choices for prime minister, 
the president has the right to disband parliament. It appeared for a short time that 
Lucinschi, who has been actively campaigning for increased powers, would use 
that opportunity. As the country slides closer to foreign debt default, however, 
and as food and energy shortages increase, Lucinschi appears to have realized 
that early parliamentary elections would serve no one.  
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Bragis now has 15 days to form a cabinet, but Lucinschi told reporters that the 
government will be announced much sooner. Then it will be left to parliament to 
accept or reject the cabinet, for the third time. Let us hope that the parliament 
has become as enlightened on the topic of new elections as the president has 
recently. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Eeny, meeny, miney, mo 
As relations between the United States and Russia deteriorate, Armenia's 
position, balanced between East and West, becomes increasingly untenable. 
How will Armenian statesmen resolve their current predicament? By forging even 
closer ties with Russia and Iran? Or can Armenia shed its old security 
arrangements in favor of a new Caucasian security system? 
 
Some have commented that the security arrangements between Armenia and 
Russia have more substance than anything envisioned in the Russia-Belarus 
Union. Armenian politicians are well aware of the depth and import of such 
contacts. "Relations with Russia have always been of strategic importance to 
Armenia and will remain as such. This is [Armenia's] top priority. Armenia intends 
to broaden these relations in all spheres and on all levels." So spoke Ara Papian, 
the press secretary of the Armenian foreign ministry, on the eve of Foreign 
Minister Vardan Oskanian's visit to Moscow. (INTERFAX, 12 Dec 99; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
For his part, Oskanian indicated that it is increasingly difficult for his country to 
avoid making a choice between the US and Russia. A new security system in the 
region could replace the precarious balancing act. He intends to discuss this 
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possibility with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia at the next meeting of the NATO 
Euroatlantic Council. (INTERFAX, 13 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Heydar Aliev of Azerbaijan 
proposed such security systems at the November OSCE summit. The 
Azerbaijani version called for removing all foreign bases from the region and 
eliminating aggression, ethnic cleansing and separatism. In addition to 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, the pact would include Russia, Turkey, the 
US, the EU and other interested members of the OSCE. The Armenian version 
envisioned participation of "all interested states" including Iran, which would have 
virtually excluded US involvement. (SNARK, 1340 GMT, 19 Nov 99; via World 
News Connection)  
 
How the gulf between the positions can be breached is unclear at present. 
However, the choice of venue for the next discussion, a NATO conference, is an 
encouraging sign nonetheless. 
 
GEORGIA 
OSCE to send observers to Chechen border segment 
Georgia's Sakinform agency reported recently that the OSCE has decided to 
send an observer mission to monitor the Chechen section of the Georgian-
Russian border. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) This news follows the 
10 December official request for such a mission from the Georgian government. 
On that occasion, the Georgian government spokesman, Avtandil Napetvaridze, 
also indicated that the United Nations was informed about the request. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 10 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Few details about this mission are available at the present writing. However, an 
international presence that monitored the activities on the border could prove 
very useful in shielding Georgia from a possible Russian incursion into its 
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territory. It could also provide independent insight into the bellicose charges 
Russia has made of late. 
 
Georgia has been subject to an unremitting barrage of unsubstantiated 
accusations from Russian media as well as military and political leaders. The 
most frequent charge is that Georgia aids in the transport of fighters and 
weapons from points outside the CIS to Chechnya. Other imaginative claims 
include reports that former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister (?) Movladi Udugov 
making contacts with Osama bin Laden through Georgian territory, that a 
Chechen government in exile was being formed in Georgia, that the abducted 
Russian MVD General Gennady Shpigun was being held in the Georgian border 
village Shatili. Last week an OSCE mission visited Shatili but refrained from 
making a formal statement about its findings. 
 
Russia has leveraged such claims to press for taking control of the Georgian 
border and threatened to impose a visa regime and other economic sanctions. 
The presence of the international mission could verify or dispel such charges, 
easing the strain on the Russian-Georgian relationship. In particular, the OSCE 
could take it upon itself to verify that Chechen fighters are not crossing into 
Georgia, easing Georgia's position vis-à-vis Russia and improving the lot of 
Chechen male refugees, all of whom have been denied entrance into Georgia in 
recent weeks. 
 
It's unclear whether the OSCE mission will serve in a narrow observer role or 
help the Georgian authorities to manage the checkpoints. The commander of the 
Georgian border guards, Valeri Chkheidze, told a meeting of CIS border troop 
officials that his country has already increased the number of guards on the 
Shatili crossing into Chechnya from 30-60 to 120 and envisions opening more 
checkpoints and increasing the number of guards to 200 when the snow begins 
to melt in March. While Georgia does not require joint protection of the border, it 
had requested material and technical assistance from Russia in early November. 
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(PRIME NEWS, 10 Dec 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
Perhaps the OSCE can play a role in supplying the needed resources and 
training without impinging on Georgia's control of the checkpoints. 
 
The OSCE decision indicates that the growing chorus of criticism over Moscow's 
brutal campaign in Chechnya, joined now by the OSCE, the Council of Europe 
and the European Union, may engender a policy to restrain at least some of the 
fallout from the war. The US State Department has also reiterated its concerns 
about the possibility of the conflict widening. State Department Spokesman 
James P. Rubin told reporters "I think it's fair to say that one of the profound 
concerns that we have about the conflict in the north Caucasus is the potential of 
it spilling over into Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the instability that could create in 
the region." (STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, 3 Dec 99; via www.state.gov) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz dispute over power supply causes more gas cutoffs 
Much of Kyrgyzstan's population was forced to do without heat or cooking fuel for 
approximately two weeks when Uzbek natural gas providers once again decided 
to stop supplying their neighbors with power on 24 November. The Kyrgyz 
government owes over $4 million in back payments for Uzbek gas supplies, only 
$800,000 of which it is required to pay in cash, according to an earlier 
agreement. The rest of the debt is to be paid in kind, including a number of flour 
shipments. Apparently the Uzbek side was no longer satisfied with this 
arrangement and demanded additional cash payments. (KYRGYZ RADIO FIRST 
PROGRAMME, 1400 GMT, 24 Nov 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-
nexis) This seems to have been at least one of the causes for the most recent 
cut in power supplies. The Uzbek president also charged Kyrgyzstan with 
defaulting on its flour shipments and said Kyrgyz citizens would have to do 
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without Uzbek fuel until the final trainload of flour arrived in Uzbekistan. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 7 Dec 99; via World News Connection) 
 
After week-long negotiations in Tashkent, the Kyrgyz government reportedly 
agreed to settle its entire $280,000 cash debt immediately and the two sides 
were also able to reach a new arrangement on flour shipments. Uztransgaz (the 
Uzbek Gas Transport Company) officials consented to resume supplying 
Kyrgyzstan with natural gas by 12 December. (KYRGYZ RADIO FIRST 
PROGRAMME, 1200 GMT, 12 Dec 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-
nexis) 
 
Some doubt has been cast on whether the Uzbek government's primary reason 
for cutting off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan was purely economic. An Iranian radio 
broadcast suggested that Uzbekistan's main objective in halting the gas 
deliveries may have been to exert political pressure on the Kyrgyz government, 
particularly in the area of border control. In mid-November a group of armed men 
staged an ambush on Uzbek law enforcement officials in Yangiobod District 
(located in the eastern part of Tashkent Oblast'), killing a number of them. The 
Uzbek government claims to have proof that the men crossed into Tashkent 
Oblast' from Kyrgyzstan and has accused Kyrgyz leaders of exercising so little 
control over their country's borders that armed criminals are able to enter and exit 
at will. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1500 GMT, 26 Nov 99; 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) Uzbek President Karimov has implied 
on more than one occasion that, if his neighbors are unable to supervise cross-
border traffic into and out of their countries adequately, then perhaps his military 
forces should undertake the task. Thus, it is certainly within the realm of 
possibility that President Karimov's regime decided to resort to economic 
measures once again in order to persuade the Kyrgyz government to accept 
Uzbek border patrols on Kyrgyz territory.  
 
UZBEKISTAN 
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Uzbek parliamentary elections fall far short of Western standards 
1,218 candidates representing five political parties (the People's Democratic 
Party -- President Karimov's former party, the Party of Self-Sacrificers -- 
President Karimov's current party, the Justice Party, the Homeland Progress 
Party, and the National Renaissance Party) competed for 250 parliamentary 
seats in Uzbekistan on 5 December. Taken at face value, this would seem to 
reflect a fairly intense competition for parliamentary positions. However, all of the 
parties which participated in the elections support the current government's 
policies. Uzbekistan's two opposition parties, Birlik (Unity) and Erk (Freedom or 
Free Will), were barred from taking part in the elections because they could not 
meet President Karimov's strict registration requirements. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 3 Dec 99; via Turkestan Newsletter) This is hardly surprising, as many 
of the opposition's leaders are still wanted on criminal charges in connection with 
the 16 February bombings in Tashkent, many more of their supporters are 
languishing in Uzbekistan's prisons, and the parties themselves are not legally 
recognized by the Uzbek government. 
 
The OSCE refused to send a full monitoring team to Uzbekistan for the elections, 
precisely because of the lack of genuine competition, but the international 
organization did permit a few of its observers to be present during the polling 
process. One of those observers, OSCE Ambassador to Uzbekistan Madeleine 
Wilkens, gave a press conference the day following the elections, during which 
she listed numerous instances of campaign violations and voter fraud. Local 
administrative officials exerted an undue amount of influence not only on the 
voting process itself, but also on which parties' candidates were permitted to 
register in which districts. Finally, OSCE officials expressed skepticism at the 
high voter turnout figures reported by Uzbek election officials (93% of the 
population is supposed to have participated in the elections). (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 6 Dec 99)  
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According to one American eyewitness, the election itself received a great deal of 
publicity. Those candidates who were permitted to register conducted very public 
campaigns, which included door-to-door visits with potential supporters, leaflet 
distribution, televised debates and television commercials. The participation of 
the two main opposition parties in this process could have moved Uzbek society 
significantly closer to a participatory democracy, and provided a peaceful way for 
voters to air their concerns and complaints. Economic and social pressures are 
mounting in Uzbek society. Many families that were once able to live comfortably 
on government salaries are now struggling to make ends meet and can no longer 
afford basic medical care and other such necessities. It is this type of pressure 
which often drives people to search for alternative political solutions; 
unfortunately, many political leaders who offer alternative solutions have been 
branded traitors and/or terrorists by the current Uzbek regime. As the Uzbek 
government continues to eliminate opportunities for people to express their 
anxieties peacefully, violent protest may become ever more attractive for many, 
especially for those who feel that they have little to lose in the first place. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Fat hits the fire as pork wars resume 
What started this past summer as a temporary protection measure for Latvia's 
pork producers has been extended into 2001, igniting a Baltic-wide pork war with 
neighbors crying foul and threatening economic sanctions. On 7 December the 
Latvian government voted to continue protecting the domestic pork market by 
establishing a minimum valuation for customs taxes against all pork imports (1.05 
lats/US$1.79 per kilogram), effective from 18 December 1999 through 17 
December 2001. These measures were meant to pick up the slack created by 
the end of earlier protectionist legislation, effective from 1 June 1999 to 17 
December, which provided for an extra customs tax on pork imports at the rate of 
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70 percent. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 7 Dec 99) 
The new rates did not appease Latvian pig-breeders, however, who claimed the 
valuation was too low, "barely above the cost-price," according to representative 
Lidija Jende. On the other side, meat packagers claim the valuation is too high. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 GMT, 7 Dec 99) 
 
Ironically, this action immediately followed statements by the head of Latvia's 
delegation to the World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle. "Latvia 
supports further market liberalization and wants the talks to deal not only with 
agricultural products and access to service markets, but also with trade, 
competition and investments," according to Foreign Ministry State Secretary 
Maris Riekstins. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 30 Nov 
99) Clearly, the only liberalization supported is that of other markets. 
 
While producers and packers quibbled over rates, Latvia's Baltic partners were 
furious about the whole scheme. Even before the bill was passed, a spokesman 
for the Estonian government was quoted as saying the proposed duties on 
imported pork violate the Baltic free trade treaty and can endanger talks on 
accession to the European Union. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1400 GMT, 3 Dec 99) Latvian Agriculture Minister Aigars Kalvitis tried to calm the 
situation by issuing assurances that the pork trade between European Union 
(EU) member countries and the Baltic states would not be affected and 
explaining that the minimum customs valuation proposed would not differ from 
the actual customs tax on imports. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1700 GMT, 7 Dec 99) What he failed to discuss, however, was that should the 
price of pork fall below the newly established minimum valuation level, the 
customs tax applied would be for the higher amount. 
 
A spokesman for the Estonian meatpacking company Rakvere LK said the new 
protection measures are more lenient than the previous system, although the 
effects would be similar. "This is better than a 70 percent customs duty, but 
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worse than Latvians observing terms of the free trade agreement," according to 
Andrit Heidov. The company representative continued to see the Latvian 
government's stance as obstructionist. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1900 GMT, 8 Dec 99) The Lithuanian foreign ministry summoned the 
Latvian ambassador for talks and presented him with a note protesting Latvia's 
move. A negative response also was received from the European Union. 
(LATVIAN RADIO, 1000 GMT, 15 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) The Estonian 
government threatened to lodge a complaint with the WTO. And Estonian Prime 
Minister Mart Laar, in a meeting with his Latvian counterpart in Helsinki, said 
Estonia intends to demand that Latvia compensate any damages incurred by the 
protective duties and to suspend talks with Latvia on a number of economic 
matters. (INTERFAX, 15 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Alas, even if the protective measures were rescinded, the Saeima also managed 
to sour other relations: According to another recently passed amendment to the 
customs law, private individuals will be allowed to bring no more than three 
kilograms of sugar into the country. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1700 GMT, 9 Dec 99) 
 
LATVIA 
Speak softly, and carry a translation dictionary 
Another action taken recently by the Latvian government was a lot less 
inflammatory: After years of discussion, vocal domestic opposition, and often 
heavy-handed international involvement, the Saeima passed an amended state 
language law. Predictably, the leadup to the final parliamentary debate did not 
proceed smoothly, as the nationalist Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction 
continued to voice its objections to any loosening of proposed regulations on the 
use of the Latvian language. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 
GMT, 6 Dec 99) In the end, however, three parliamentary factions -- Latvia's 
Way, People's Party and the New Party -- agreed to support the amended draft, 
guaranteeing a majority of votes. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
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1900 GMT, 8 Dec 99) On 9 December, the law was passed with 52 votes against 
26, with 2 abstentions. The law regulates the use and protection of the state 
language in the state sector as well as the private sphere if such use would affect 
the interests of society, such as public safety, health and health care, morals, the 
protection of consumer and labor rights, workplace security and public 
administration. The law does not refer to the use of language in informal 
communications, the issue that constituted the major stumbling block to 
international acceptance of previous versions. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1700 GMT, 9 Dec 99) 
 
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who had sent an earlier version back for further 
parliamentary discussion and revision, was pleased with the end result. "Nobody 
will be able to find anything to object to in the wording now upheld. [The law] fully 
complies with our international legal obligations," she said. While less exuberant, 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel did say that 
the adopted law is "essentially in conformity" with Latvia's international 
obligations. EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenther Verheugen also approved. 
"My first evaluation is positive. The result of today represents an important step 
towards striking the right balance between protecting Latvia's national and 
cultural heritage and aspiring to the high standards prevailing in the European 
family of nations," he said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 
GMT, 9 Dec 99) 
 
Despite Vike-Freiberga's optimism, there was one party expressing 
dissatisfaction: Russia. To no one's great surprise, the Russian foreign ministry 
sharply criticized the law, calling it "unacceptable" and "discriminatory." 
Apparently seeing no irony considering the treatment of Caucasian peoples in 
the Russian Federation, Moscow declared that Latvia's language law was "a sign 
of a humanitarian catastrophe that almost a million people [sic] without 
citizenship are deprived of basic rights including the right for a dignified life, that 
they are treated as pariahs in a country which they consider their native home, 
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that they are in effect pushed out and labeled 'occupants and murderers' and a 
hysteria of historic vengeance is escalated around them." (INTERFAX, 1156 
GMT, 10 Dec 99; via World News Connection) In response, Latvian Prime 
Minister Andris Skele joked that, due to a Y2K bug, the Russian foreign ministry 
computer system was inadvertently printing out 10-year-old documents. (BNS, 
1005 GMT, 13 Dec 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, the Dutch government offered practical assistance to cope with a 
lack of Latvian fluency by agreeing to provide financial support for a Latvian 
language teaching program. On 1 December, Dutch Minister for European Affairs 
Dick Benschop and Jan Sorenson, the representative of the UN Development 
Program to Latvia, signed an agreement, which will provide 400,000 guilders 
(approximately US$173,000) toward a teaching program. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 GMT, 1 Dec 99) 
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